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Blog · November 4, 2026

Five phishing red flags we keep seeing in Alaska inboxes

Not the generic advice. The five specific tricks that get through to Anchorage businesses right now, why they work, and a thirty-second habit that stops most of them. Plus a free tool that checks a suspicious link without clicking it.

By Orion Grimm

Every security awareness course says the same things: check the sender, hover over links, do not open attachments you did not expect. All true, all useless at 4:50 p.m. on a Friday when the email looks exactly like the one you get every month.

Here are the five patterns that actually reach the businesses we protect, based on what our clients forward us and what our filtering catches. Then one habit that beats most of them.

1. The vendor whose bank details “changed”

An email from a supplier you really do pay, saying they have moved banks, with a new account number for the next invoice. The sender’s domain is one letter off, or it is the real vendor’s compromised mailbox. The invoice is real. Only the account number is not.

Why it works: everything about it is routine except the one line that matters. The fix is a rule, not a skill. Any change to payment details gets confirmed by a phone call to a number you already had, never a number in the email.

2. The Microsoft 365 or Google sign-in page that is not

“Your password expires today.” “A document has been shared with you.” “Unusual sign-in activity.” The link goes to a page that looks identical to the real login. You type your password. You have just handed over your mailbox, and the attacker now sends pattern number one to your customers from your real address.

Why it works: the page is pixel-perfect, and people are trained to log in when asked. Two things stop it. Multi-factor authentication that uses a phone prompt or a security key, so a stolen password alone is useless. And the habit of never logging in from a link in an email: open a new tab, type the address, log in there.

3. The text from the boss who needs gift cards

“Are you at your desk? I need a favor, I am in a meeting.” It comes by text or from a free email address with the owner’s name on it. Ten minutes later it is gift cards, or a wire, or a change to payroll direct deposit.

Why it works: it targets the newest, most helpful employee, and it uses urgency and authority. The fix is cultural. Every business we onboard gets one sentence added to its handbook: the owner will never ask for gift cards, wires, or payroll changes by text or email, and any such request is confirmed by voice.

4. The shared file from someone you actually know

A real contact’s mailbox was compromised. You get a genuine-looking “so-and-so shared a file with you” from their real address, pointing at a real cloud-storage page, which hosts a link to the fake login from number two. Every link in the chain is legitimate except the last one.

Why it works: it comes from a real person you correspond with, so it passes every “check the sender” rule. The tell is context. Were you expecting a file from them? If not, ask them, by any channel other than replying to that email.

5. The invoice attachment that is a web page

An attachment named something like Invoice_4471.html. Opening it shows a login prompt “to view the secure document.” It is a phishing page delivered as a file so that it never has to pass through a link scanner.

Why it works: attachments feel more legitimate than links, and .html files open in a browser without warning. Any HTML attachment from outside your company should be treated as hostile. Our filtering strips them by default.

The thirty-second habit

Before you click anything in an email that asks you to do something, pause and ask one question: did I expect this? Not “does it look real.” Attackers are good at real. Expected or unexpected. If it is unexpected, verify by a different channel: call the person, open the site in a new tab, ask a coworker.

And if there is a link you are unsure about, paste it into our phishing link checker. It examines the link as text, in your browser, without ever opening it, and points out lookalike domains, hidden redirects, and the character tricks these campaigns use.

If one got through

Change the password on the affected account from a different device, turn on multi-factor authentication if it was not on, and tell whoever runs your IT immediately, even if you are embarrassed. The first hour matters most and nobody who does this work will think less of you. Everyone has clicked one.

If nobody runs your IT and that sentence made you nervous, the free conversation is thirty minutes. We will tell you what the first three things to fix are.